# macOS Overlay ## Scope and discovery macOS uses Apple-owned system-management layers, not lightly branded Linux or BSD rc controls. Record macOS version, architecture, user versus system context, device ownership, and available recovery/console access. Discover MDM enrollment, configuration profiles, management tooling, FileVault implications, and authorized administration route. Identify whether the requested state is owned by macOS, a profile, MDM, launchd, application, or third-party package manager. Discover network-service, VPN, DNS, route, Application Firewall, PF, and remote-login ownership before access-sensitive work. Identify signed-system-volume, SIP, TCC, privacy, and platform-security constraints as policy boundaries. Treat unknown management/profile ownership as a blocker for persistent configuration mutation. ## Read-only preflight Inspect the operating-system version, Apple update availability, reboot implications, and management/profile state. Inspect launchd domain, label, owner, executable, configuration provenance, process state, and bounded relevant log evidence. Inspect listener behavior and the actual user, client, or dependent-service boundary. Inspect installed third-party package managers and their prefixes, provenance, service ownership, and user context. Inspect active network services, configuration source, firewall/PF ownership, remote-access route, and recovery path. Inspect storage, FileVault/restart recovery implications, backup scope, free space, and application compatibility for lifecycle work. End discovery after the durable owner and verification boundary are established; do not bypass platform controls. ## Command preflight Run only commands applicable to the observed macOS release and domain. `softwareupdate --list` may make an outbound vendor query but does not perform an update; it still needs normal authorized network access. A profile, MDM enrollment, PF state, or Application Firewall state identifies a follow-up ownership question, not permission to change it. PF inspection requires authorized privilege on the target; a missing, empty, or permission-denied PF result is `unknown`, not evidence that PF is inactive. Profile payload inspection is sensitive: scope and redact it through an authorized management path, and do not paste payloads into evidence. | Question | Read-only command | |---|---| | OS and Apple updates | `sw_vers`; `softwareupdate --list` | | launchd job and bounded logs | `launchctl print system/