mirror of
https://github.com/magnus919/agent-skills.git
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usernameandfactory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
476d7e11b0
Add ruff linter/formatter with pre-commit hooks, pytest-cov with 60% coverage threshold, CODEOWNERS, Dependabot for pip/GHA updates, and .env.example. Auto-fix existing ruff violations across eval_runner/ and scripts/. 10 agent-readiness criteria resolved: lint_config, formatter, pre_commit_hooks, naming_consistency, dead_code_detection, test_coverage_thresholds, test_performance_tracking, codeowners, dependency_update_automation, env_template. Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
106 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
106 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
"""Validation and containment helpers for repository-controlled eval paths."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import errno
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import hashlib
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import os
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import re
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import stat
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from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
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_CASE_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*", re.ASCII)
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def validate_case_id(case_id: str) -> str:
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"""Return a safe case ID or raise ValueError for unsafe input."""
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if not isinstance(case_id, str) or len(case_id) > 64 or _CASE_ID_RE.fullmatch(case_id) is None:
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raise ValueError(
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"invalid eval case ID: expected 1-64 lowercase ASCII letters or digits "
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"separated by single hyphens"
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)
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return case_id
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def validate_relative_path(path_text: str) -> str:
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"""Return a schema-compatible relative POSIX path or raise ValueError."""
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if not isinstance(path_text, str) or not path_text or not path_text.strip():
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raise ValueError("invalid relative path: expected a non-empty path")
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if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in path_text):
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raise ValueError("invalid relative path: control characters are forbidden")
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if "\\" in path_text or path_text.endswith("/"):
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raise ValueError("invalid relative path: backslashes and trailing slashes are forbidden")
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lexical_parts = path_text.split("/")
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if any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in lexical_parts):
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raise ValueError("invalid relative path: '.', '..', and empty components are forbidden")
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pure = PurePosixPath(path_text)
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if pure.is_absolute() or not pure.parts:
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raise ValueError("invalid relative path: expected a relative POSIX path")
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return path_text
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def hash_contained_file(root: Path, relative_path: str) -> str | None:
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"""Hash a regular file beneath root without following symlinks.
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Returns ``None`` when the path is absent or not a regular file. Every path
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component is opened descriptor-relatively with ``O_NOFOLLOW`` so a
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validation-to-read symlink swap cannot redirect the read outside ``root``.
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"""
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validate_relative_path(relative_path)
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root_path = root.resolve(strict=True)
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parts = PurePosixPath(relative_path).parts
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opened_fds: list[int] = []
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try:
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current_fd = os.open(
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root_path,
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os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW,
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)
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opened_fds.append(current_fd)
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for component in parts[:-1]:
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current_fd = os.open(
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component,
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os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW,
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dir_fd=current_fd,
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)
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opened_fds.append(current_fd)
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file_fd = os.open(
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parts[-1],
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os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NONBLOCK | os.O_NOFOLLOW,
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dir_fd=current_fd,
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)
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opened_fds.append(file_fd)
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if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(file_fd).st_mode):
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return None
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digest = hashlib.sha256()
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while chunk := os.read(file_fd, 64 * 1024):
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digest.update(chunk)
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return digest.hexdigest()[:16]
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except FileNotFoundError:
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return None
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except OSError as exc:
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if exc.errno in {errno.ELOOP, errno.ENOTDIR}:
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raise ValueError(
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f"unsafe symlink component in contained path: {relative_path}"
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) from exc
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raise
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finally:
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for descriptor in reversed(opened_fds):
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os.close(descriptor)
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def contained_path(root: Path, *parts: str) -> Path:
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"""Resolve a child path and require it to remain beneath *root*."""
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resolved_root = root.resolve()
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candidate = resolved_root.joinpath(*parts).resolve()
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try:
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candidate.relative_to(resolved_root)
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise ValueError(f"output path escapes designated root: {candidate}") from exc
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return candidate
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