Live: lock down the local server against same-machine token theft (#304)

Two defense-in-depth layers close the P1 in issue #304, where any browser
tab on the machine could fetch /live.js, extract the embedded token, and
drive every token-gated route.

1. Loopback-restricted CORS. The shared handler replaced its wildcard
   `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` with reflection gated on a strict
   isLoopbackOrigin() that URL-parses the Origin (so localhost.evil.com and
   127.0.0.1.evil.com fail) and accepts only http/https on localhost,
   127.0.0.1, or [::1]. Reflection always pairs with `Vary: Origin` so a
   cache never hands one origin's authorized response to another. Remote
   origins get no ACAO header; origin-less callers (script tags, curl, the
   agent's own fetches) are unaffected.

2. Token-gated /live.js. The handler now 401s unless `?token=` matches
   state.token, so the bundle (which embeds the token) is no longer served
   to unauthenticated local pages. The injected <script src> carries the
   token: live.mjs passes --token to live-inject.mjs, which threads it
   through every injection path (HTML/JSX tag, Nuxt plugin, SvelteKit root
   component) via a shared buildLiveScriptSrc(). The token stays optional in
   live-inject so static fixture tests keep their bare src.

Tests: new live-server integration cases for the 401 gate, remote-origin
denial, loopback reflection + Vary, and token-guarded routes under a
loopback Origin; e2e session harness now injects with the token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

tests/live-server.test.mjs

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ describe('live-server integration', () => {
     // rather than an inline copy, so the server must serialize the canonical
     // vocabulary into /live.js (next to the token/port).
     const { LIVE_COMMANDS } = await import('../skill/scripts/live/vocabulary.mjs');
-    const body = await (await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js`)).text();
+    const body = await (await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js?token=${server.token}`)).text();
     assert.match(body, /window\.__IMPECCABLE_VOCAB__\s*=/);
     const injected = JSON.parse(body.match(/window\.__IMPECCABLE_VOCAB__\s*=\s*(\[.*?\]);/s)[1]);
     assert.deepEqual(injected, LIVE_COMMANDS);
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ describe('live-server integration', () => {
   });
 
   it('/live.js serves script with token injected', async () => {
-    const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js`);
+    const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js?token=${server.token}`);
     assert.equal(res.status, 200);
     assert.equal(res.headers.get('content-type'), 'application/javascript');
     const text = await res.text();
@@ -302,6 +302,64 @@ describe('live-server integration', () => {
     );
   });
 
+  it('/live.js returns 401 without the token and 200 with it', async () => {
+    const noToken = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js`);
+    assert.equal(noToken.status, 401);
+
+    const wrongToken = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js?token=not-the-token`);
+    assert.equal(wrongToken.status, 401);
+
+    const ok = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/live.js?token=${server.token}`);
+    assert.equal(ok.status, 200);
+    const body = await ok.text();
+    assert.ok(body.includes('__IMPECCABLE_LIVE_INIT__'), 'authorized /live.js returns the assembled bundle');
+  });
+
+  it('CORS: a remote origin gets no Access-Control-Allow-Origin on any route', async () => {
+    const evil = 'https://evil.example';
+    for (const path of ['/health', `/live.js?token=${server.token}`, `/status?token=${server.token}`]) {
+      const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}${path}`, { headers: { Origin: evil } });
+      assert.equal(
+        res.headers.get('access-control-allow-origin'),
+        null,
+        `remote origin must not be reflected on ${path}`,
+      );
+    }
+    // Preflight from a remote origin is likewise unauthorized to read.
+    const preflight = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/poll`, {
+      method: 'OPTIONS',
+      headers: { Origin: evil, 'Access-Control-Request-Method': 'POST' },
+    });
+    assert.equal(preflight.headers.get('access-control-allow-origin'), null);
+  });
+
+  it('CORS: a loopback origin is reflected with Vary: Origin', async () => {
+    for (const origin of [
+      `http://localhost:${server.port}`,
+      'http://127.0.0.1:5173',
+      'http://[::1]:5173',
+    ]) {
+      const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/health`, { headers: { Origin: origin } });
+      assert.equal(res.headers.get('access-control-allow-origin'), origin, `reflect ${origin}`);
+      const vary = res.headers.get('vary') || '';
+      assert.ok(/\bOrigin\b/i.test(vary), `Vary: Origin present for ${origin}, got "${vary}"`);
+    }
+    // A hostname that merely extends "localhost" must not pass the loopback test.
+    const spoof = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/health`, {
+      headers: { Origin: 'http://localhost.evil.com' },
+    });
+    assert.equal(spoof.headers.get('access-control-allow-origin'), null, 'localhost.evil.com must not be reflected');
+  });
+
+  it('token-guarded routes still work with a loopback Origin header', async () => {
+    const origin = `http://localhost:${server.port}`;
+    const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server.port}/status?token=${server.token}`, {
+      headers: { Origin: origin },
+    });
+    assert.equal(res.status, 200);
+    assert.equal(res.headers.get('access-control-allow-origin'), origin);
+  });
+
   it('/design-system.json reads DESIGN.md plus .impeccable/design.json', async () => {
     const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'impeccable-design-system-'));
     let designServer;